Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

ingly precious funds on behalf of nations that are apparently
unwilling to devote the necessary resources
or make the necessary changes to be serious <strong>and</strong> capable
partners in their own defense. . . . Indeed, if current
trends in the decline of European defense capabilities
are not halted <strong>and</strong> reversed, future U.S. political leaders—those
for whom the Cold War was not the formative
experience that it was for me—may not consider
the return on America’s investment in <strong>NATO</strong> worth
the cost. 7
As Secretary Panetta warned the following October:
“Many might assume that the U.S. defense budget
is so large it can absorb <strong>and</strong> cover Alliance shortcomings—but
make no mistake about it, we are facing
dramatic cuts with real implications for Alliance capability.”
8
PRIORITIZING CAPABILITIES
Differences in Allies’ threat assessments <strong>and</strong> their
willingness to assume certain operational <strong>and</strong> budgetary
responsibilities make it harder to agree on the priority
of capabilities that need to be preserved, much
less the new capabilities that must be developed. To
date, <strong>NATO</strong> has been better at launching high-profile
capabilities initiatives—recall, for example, the 1999
Defense Capabilities Initiative <strong>and</strong> 2002 Prague Capabilities
Commitment—than delivering credible
results. (As this chapter is written, the 2010 Lisbon
Critical Capabilities package appears somewhat more
productive than its predecessors.) Meanwhile, the
overall financial <strong>and</strong> economic prospects for most Allies
have degraded further since the <strong>NATO</strong> Secretary
General outlined his “Smart Defense” concept in February
2011.
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