Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

gram is seen with growing apprehension). In addition, Turkish civilian
<strong>and</strong> military authorities view Turkey’s <strong>NATO</strong> membership
as a potent symbol of the country’s belonging to the West <strong>and</strong>
the U.S. TNWs as an emblem of the country’s privileged status
within the Alliance which must be preserved. Mustafa Kibaroglu,
“Turkey, <strong>NATO</strong> & <strong>and</strong> <strong>Nuclear</strong> Sharing: Prospects after <strong>NATO</strong>’s
Lisbon Summit,” <strong>Nuclear</strong> Policy Paper No. 5, Arms Control Association
, British American Security Information Council, Institute
for Peace Research <strong>and</strong> Security Policy at the University of
Hamburg (IFSH), April 2011, p. 3. In short, especially after the reluctance
<strong>and</strong> sluggishness of some <strong>NATO</strong> members to respond to
Turkey’s concerns in the context of the 1991 <strong>and</strong> 2003 Gulf Wars,
Turkish officials are not confident that the extended deterrence
of the Alliance would work effectively without the physical presence
of U.S. forward-deployment on its soil (Ibid.). As correctly
observed by a former British secretary of state for defence, TNWs
are not important to Ankara because of the weapons themselves
or their military value but because the relationship between Turkey,
the United States, <strong>and</strong> the other <strong>NATO</strong> members is strained
for other reasons, including the perception that Turkey’s national
security priorities are poorly understood by the allies, the damaging
experience of the Bush administration, <strong>and</strong> the perceived
failure of the United States to help Turkey in its struggle with the
Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK). If Ankara’s wider concerns can
be addressed, further reduction in TNW numbers might be possible.
See Des Browne, “Current <strong>NATO</strong> <strong>Nuclear</strong> Policy,” in Paul
Ingram <strong>and</strong> Oliver Meier, eds., Reducing the Role of <strong>Tactical</strong> <strong>Nuclear</strong>
<strong>Weapons</strong> in Europe: Perspectives <strong>and</strong> Proposals on the <strong>NATO</strong> Policy
Debate, ACA <strong>and</strong> BASIC Report, May 2011, p. 7.
11. With the main aim of addressing the Russian concerns
about the effects of <strong>NATO</strong> enlargement on the countries of Central
<strong>and</strong> Eastern Europe (CEE). <strong>NATO</strong> has declared that it has “no
intention, no plan, <strong>and</strong> no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on
the territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspect
of <strong>NATO</strong>’s nuclear posture or nuclear policy.” See Founding Act
on Mutual Relations, Cooperation <strong>and</strong> Security between <strong>NATO</strong> <strong>and</strong> the
Russian Federation, May 27, 1997, available at www.nato.int/cps/en/
natolive/official_texts_25468.htm.
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