ovde - vera znanje mir

Може ли група стећи право сецесије после избијања насилног сецесионистичког сукоба у
којем сецесионисти вољно суделују употребљавајући своје војне снаге, организоване пре
њихове декларације сецесије?
Ако је одговор (као што сугерише Бјукенен) потврдан, онда Бјукененови критеријуми
обезбеђују сецесионистичким покретима користан инструмент за стицање међународног
признања: сецесионистички покрет може наоружати своје следбенике и онда покренути или
се упустити у сукоб са матичном државом са циљем осигурања међународне хуманитарне
интервенције и признања његове сецесије. У складу с тим, може се тврдити да су
сецесионистички лидери Словеније и Косова имали сличан сценарио. Ако је одговор
одричан, онда Бјукененова теорија – слично свим нормативним теоријама о којима се овде
расправљало – не нуди руководство за то како међународне организације и
друге/спољашње државе треба да одговоре сецесионистичким покретима који
употребљавају силу за остварење својих сецесионистичких циљева. На пример, Бјукенен не
замишља могућност међународне војне интервенције против сецесионистичких војних
снага у оним случајевима – таквим као што је Словенија – у којима нека сецесионистичка
група нема (на почетку) никакво право на сецесију као лек, али употребљава силу да би
извршила сецесију.
State-Making and Nation-Building
Sunday, January 27th, 2008
by Anthony D. Smith
In the modern world only one form of political unit is recognized and permitted. This is the form
we call the ‘nation-state’.ft is easy enough to discover. Nation-states have frontiers, capitals, flags,
anthems, passports, currencies, military parades, national museums, embassies and usually a seat
at the United Nations. They also have one government for the territory of the nation-state, a single
education system, a single economy and occupational system, and usually one set oflegal rights for
all citizens, though there are exceptions. (In some federal systems, there may be citizenship rights
for all members of the nation-state, but also communal rights for members of particular
communities.) They also subscribe, tacitly or openly, quietly or vociferously, to a single ideology
which legitimates the whole enterprise - nationalism. Indeed, the whole system of states is built on
its assumptions, even if its practice does not often conform to nationalist precepts. We even call it
the ‘international’ system.
At the same time, as has often been pointed out, there are actually very few genuine ‘nation-states’
today. I f we mean by the term ‘nation-state’ that the boundaries of the state’s territories and those
of a homogenous ethnic community are coextensive, and that all the inhabitants of a state possess
an identical culture, then we will not be able to muster more than about 10 per cent of existing
states as candidates for the title of
‘nation-state’. Leaving aside tiny minorities, we may perhaps be able to include a few more, apart
from states like Portugal, Greece, Poland and Somalia; Holland, Denmark and the two Germanies
have small minorities, but are by now otherwise homogeneous, if we leave aside the immigrant
workers. In other states - Sweden, Norway and Finland, for example - the Lapp and Karelian
minorities do not, perhaps cannot, impair the cultural unity of the state. Yet, this leaves a very
considerable number, perhaps over half, with serious ethnic divisions which may spill over into
antagonism, and another large group, perhaps a quarter of the total, in which a dominant culturecommunity
must accommodate the demands of ‘peripheral’ ethnie, as in Britain, France and
Canada, Romania and Bulgaria. In the 50 per cent with serious cultural cleavages, it has not
always been possible to contain the competing demands or meet the claims of rival communities.
In India, Sri Lanka, Burma, the Philippines, Indonesia, Laos, Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Cyprus, Spain,
Yugoslavia, Corsica’ (France), Ireland, Chad, Nigeria, Cameroons, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe,