ovde - vera znanje mir

een permitted to do so, would be to employ a conception of the justice that begs the question in
this context, because it includes elements that are denied by one of the parties to the debate,
namely Remedial Right Only Theorists. To repeat: the point is that Primary Right Theories are
committed to the view that there is a right to secede even from a state that is perfectly just in the
standard and uncontroversial, and hence theoryneutral sense.16
III. CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING PROPOSALS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
RIGHT TO SECEDE
With this classification of types of theories of the right to secede in mind, we can now proceed to
their comparative evaluation. Special attention will be given to considerations that loom large,
once we look to these theories for guidance in formulating proposals for a practical and morally
progressive international legal approach to dealing with secession crises. The following criteria for
the comparative assessment of competing proposals for how international law ought to understand
the right to secede are not offered as exhaustive. They will suffice, however, to establish two
significant conclusions. First, theories of the moral right to secede that might initially appear
reasonable are seen to be seriously deficient when viewed as elements of an institutional morality
articulated in a system of international law. Second, some current theories of the right to secede
are much more promising candidates for providing guidance for international law than others.
Others fail to take into account some of the most critical considerations relevant to the project of
providing a moral foundation for an international institutional response to secession crises.
1. Minimal Realism. A proposal for an international legal right to secede ought to be morally
progressive, yet at the same time at least minimally realistic. A morally progressive proposal is
one which, if implemented with a reasonable degree of success, would better serve basic values
than the status quo. Preeminent among these values is the protection of human rights.
A proposal satisfies the requirement of minimal realism if it has a significant prospect of
eventually being adopted in the foreseeable future, through the processes by which international
law is actually made. As we shall see, it is important to keep in mind one crucial feature of this
process: International law is made by existing states (that are recognized to be legitimate by the
international community).’7
Minimal realism is not slavish deference to current political feasibility. The task of the political
philosopher concerned to provide principles for an international legal response to secession crises
is in part to set moral targets-to make a persuasive case for trying to transcend the current limits of
political feasibility in pursuit of moral progress. Nevertheless, moral targets should not be so
distant that efforts to reach them are not only doomed to failure, but unlikely to produce any
valuable results at all.
To summarize: A theory is morally progressive and minimally realistic if and only if its
implementation would better serve basic values than the status quo and if it has some significant
prospect of eventually being implemented through the actual processes by which international law
is made and applied.
2. Consistency with Well-Entrenched, Morally Progressive Principles of International Law. A
proposal should build upon, or at least not squarely contradict, the more morally acceptable
principles of existing international law, when these principles are interpreted in a morally
progressive way. If at all possible, acceptance and implementation of a new principle should not
come at the price of calling into question the validity of a well-entrenched, morally progressive
principle.
3. Absence of Perverse Incentives. At least when generally accepted and effectively implemented
under reasonably favorable circumstances, a proposal should not create perverse incentives. In
other words, acceptance of the proposal, and recognition that it is an element of the system of
international institutional conflict resolution, should not encourage behavior that undermines
morally sound principles of international law or of morality, nor should it hinder the pursuit of
morally progressive strategies for conflict resolution, or the attainment of desirable outcomes such