28.12.2012 Aufrufe

Umstrittene Schweizer Sicherheitspolitik ... - ETH Zürich

Umstrittene Schweizer Sicherheitspolitik ... - ETH Zürich

Umstrittene Schweizer Sicherheitspolitik ... - ETH Zürich

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Institute<br />

tion proliferation, regional conflicts, state failure, organized crime, and<br />

internal conflicts. Sweden’s list is almost identical, it adds cross-border<br />

trafficking in drugs, women and weapons, and cyber-terrorism or attacks<br />

on IT systems. In the UK, the list is terrorism, weapons of mass destruction,<br />

transnational organized crime, and failed states. I think the same<br />

kind of list would be broadly true for Switzerland, and should in some<br />

way be reflected in its security policy statement.<br />

What are the common features underlying these lists? There are three<br />

broad transformations in the nature of threats that we can see probably<br />

more clearly than a decade ago when the last Swiss security policy report<br />

was released. The first of these transformations is the “transnational” and<br />

networked nature of most emerging threats. Whether it is terrorism, cybersecurity,<br />

large-scale organized crime, trafficking in drugs, weapons or other<br />

illegal goods – all of these threats are, as the French government puts it in its<br />

statement, “des menaces de multiples natures, diffuses, polymorphes et globales...<br />

Asymétriques, sans frontière et utilisant de nouveaux modes d’action.”<br />

I don’t think I need to provide details of specific threats, but I would point<br />

out that most of the networks and networked threats that we see follow a<br />

fairly straightforward logic: they look for weak spots, black holes, safe havens,<br />

and areas where they can conduct their affairs with little scrutiny and relative<br />

impunity. They also disperse their activities geographically, so that careful scrutiny<br />

would only uncover one piece of the puzzle, and you would not likely<br />

be able to have a clear view of the entire enterprise – whether it is criminal<br />

activities or smuggling of dual-use goods – without additional information<br />

from other sources. In other words, networked actors operate “in between”<br />

states, making it difficult for any one state to identify clearly whether an activity<br />

on its territory is part of a larger security threat or challenge.<br />

The second feature of contemporary threats is that they blur and<br />

sometimes in fact completely erase the distinction between what was<br />

“internal” and what was “external”. Transnational threats are not “out<br />

there”, but manifest themselves within state borders. The bombings in<br />

September 2001, the London and Madrid bombings – the London bombings<br />

were committed by UK citizens working on British soil – have been<br />

domestic manifestations of transnational threats. This calls into question<br />

the decades-old – if not centuries-old – division of labour between armed<br />

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