Umstrittene Schweizer Sicherheitspolitik ... - ETH Zürich

Vladimir A. Orlov
Orlov Vladimir A.: Since I have to follow events in Pakistan from Bern
today, I am not familiar with every detail. However, I am convinced that
this issue is of primary concern. In brief: there is a risk. I know that the
US take it very seriously, but unfortunately they are late in responding.
What is more, it would be an illusion to think that the US can control
everything in Pakistan. So what we have is a very unfortunate and unfavourable
combination of factors. Even if the Taliban are not gaining
control of political mechanisms in Pakistan, the current situation shows
that they are present in a very significant way.
My first concern is the risk of disintegration of the country. Though
the Taliban may not gain control of the whole country, they will remain
in control of a considerable part of it. Pakistan is unstable; it was built
out of pieces. Some nations that were built out of pieces have quite a
solid basis – Pakistan does not.
History supplies us only with one example of the disintegration of a
state with nuclear weapons: the Soviet Union. I know better than many
do how painful and risky it was to guarantee that not a single nuclear
warhead was lost or stolen – in spite of the courage and responsibility
the Russian military displayed. With regard to Pakistan, I am seriously
worried because of the presence there of non-state and quasi-state actors.
As a result, what I recommend differs from what can be read in nonproliferation
books. For some time, my recommendation has been that
the US, China, Russia – key players in issues in and around Pakistan
as well as with regard to non-proliferation – should work together on a
solution, maybe a radical one. Maybe they should do so together with
India. I know that such a non-traditional approach is not favoured, but let
me put it this way: the question is whether we can afford sitting around
and reading in books that, ideally, things should be addressed through
negotiations, or whether we should meet the threats as nuclear weapons
could, for the first time in history, really fall into the hands of non-state
or quasi-state actors.
Bölsterli Andreas: What means, techniques or expertise do you think
Switzerland could bring into a future security architecture in Europe or
in a European organisation?
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