Comunicação e Ética: O sistema semiótico de Charles ... - Ubi Thesis

✐✐✐✐A Dimensão Comunicacional da Semiótica de Peirce 89reduzir toda a acção mental à fórmula do raciocínio válido, relacionando jáa inferência hipotética com a quantidade de informação disponível, e adiantandoas traves mestras do seu falibilismo: uma inferência provável é correctana condição de as premissas que a sustentam representarem a totalidade doconhecimento disponível sobre o assunto – sobrando assim espaço para umaumento de informação que faça evoluir as conclusões da inferência. 33Na sua tentativa de reduzir a acção mental à forma da inferência Peircedistinguirá a dedução, da indução e da hipótese ou abdução. 34 Acredita quecom isto pode responder à maior crítica que é feita à sua concepção lógicada actividade do intelecto: a possibilidade de erro. Tenta então provar quetodos os casos concebíveis de pensamento erróneo podem ser reconduzidos aoperações “fracas”, no sentido de pertencerem à lógica não demonstrativa dasinferências sintéticas, e que contudo são fundamentalmente válidas. 3533 . “ On the other hand, suppose that we reason as follows: "A certain man had the Asiaticcholera. He was in a state of collapse, livid, quite cold, and without perceptible pulse. Hewas bled copiously. During the process he came out of collapse, and the next morning waswell enough to be about. Therefore, bleeding tends to cure the cholera."This is a fair probableinference, provided that the premisses represent our whole knowledge of the matter. But ifwe knew, for example, that recoveries from cholera were apt to be sudden, and that the physicianwho had reported this case had known of a hundred other trials of the remedy withoutcommunicating the result, then the inference would lose all its validity” in Writings of CharlesSanders Peirce: A Chronological Edition, ed. FISCH, Max, et al., Bloomington, IndianaUniversity Press, vol. II, p. 215.34 . “The absence of knowledge which is essential to the validity of any probable argumentrelates to some question which is determined by the argument itself. This question, like everyother, is whether certain objects have certain characters. Hence, the absence of knowledge iseither whether besides the objects which, according to the premisses, possess certain characters,any other objects possess them; or, whether besides the characters which, according tothe premisses, belong to certain objects, any other characters not necessarily involved in thesebelong to the same objects. In the former case, the reasoning proceeds as though all the objectswhich have certain characters were known, and this is induction; in the latter case, the inferenceproceeds as though all the characters requisite to the determination of a certain object orclass were known, and this is hypothesis”, Idem.35 . “ An apparent obstacle to the reduction of all mental action to the type of valid inferencesis the existence of fallacious reasoning. Every argument implies the truth of a generalprinciple of inferential procedure (whether involving some matter of fact concerning the subjectof argument, or merely a maxim relating to a system of signs), according to which it is avalid argument. If this principle is false, the argument is a fallacy; but neither a valid argumentfrom false premisses, nor an exceedingly weak, but not altogether illegitimate, induction orhypothesis, however its force may be over-estimated, however false its conclusion, is a fallacy.www.labcom.pt✐✐✐✐