Comunicação e Ética: O sistema semiótico de Charles ... - Ubi Thesis

✐✐✐✐382 Anabela Gradimtemas se afastam de tais assuntos “abstractos”, menor possibilidade existe dealcançar tal precisão de discurso”. 24E é neste ponto que Peirce acaba por se aproximar de Austin, ao considerarque toda a asserção e todo o juízo, ao mesmo tempo que são vagas, são um tipode acto, que realiza alguma coisa no mundo, e exige do enunciador que tomeresponsabilidade pela afirmação que acaba de proferir, pois esta tem comoreferência o verdadeiro e intende que o seu destinatário a tome como tal. 25Deste modo todo o juizo, que tem como missão veicular conceitos, tem porreferência a verdade, implica uma responsabilidade por parte do enunciador,envolve sempre algum tipo de “acto”, exerce “uma energia” e está sujeito aproduzir efeitos bem reais. 26Ora este carácter accional da linguagem e do juízo, seja na troca intersubjectiva,seja na compreensão e raciocínio, é comunicacional também quandodemanda que o locutor assuma responsabilidade pelos seus actos, e que aquelea quem se dirige o discurso (seja outrem, seja o ego num diferente momentotemporal) se deixe persuadir por tal acto de fala e tenha ao mesmo tempo a24 . Collected Papers, 5.447.25 . “ If a man desires to assert anything very solemnly, he takes such steps as will enable himto go before a magistrate or notary and take a binding oath to it. Taking an oath is not mainlyan event of the nature of a setting forth, Vorstellung, or representing. It is not mere saying,but is doing. The law, I believe, calls it an "act."At any rate, it would be followed by veryreal effects, in case the substance of what is asserted should be proved untrue. This ingredient,the assuming of responsibility, which is so prominent in solemn assertion, must be present inevery genuine assertion. For clearly, every assertion involves an effort to make the intendedinterpreter believe what is asserted, to which end a reason for believing it must be furnished.But if a lie would not endanger the esteem in which the utterer was held, nor otherwise be aptto entail such real effects as he would avoid, the interpreter would have no reason to believethe assertion. Nobody takes any positive stock in those conventional utterances, such as "I amperfectly delighted to see you,"upon whose falsehood no punishment at all is visited. At thispoint, the reader should call to mind, or, if he does not know it, should make the observationsrequisite to convince himself, that even in solitary meditation every judgment is an effort topress home, upon the self of the immediate future and of the general future, some truth. It isa genuine assertion, just as the vernacular phrase represents it; and solitary dialectic is still ofthe nature of dialogue. Consequently it must be equally true that here too there is contained anelement of assuming responsibility, of "taking the consequences."”, Collected Papers, 5.546.26 . “ That is the first point of this argument; namely, that the judgment, which is the solevehicle in which a concept can be conveyed to a person’s cognizance or acquaintance, is nota purely representitious event, but involves an act, an exertion of energy, and is liable to realconsequences, or effects”, Collected Papers, 5.547.www.labcom.pt✐✐✐✐