Comunicação e Ética: O sistema semiótico de Charles ... - Ubi Thesis

✐✐✐✐264 Anabela GradimO significado de qualquer concepção não pode, assim, ser reduzido a umaqualquer actualidade ou conjunto de actualidades, mas tem de ser expresso poruma proposição condicional, um would-be, como Peirce lhe chama, sendo quewould-be’s de antecedente falsa são vacuidades pragmáticas, expressões semqualquer sentido. 117 Os would-be’s têm tendência a governar os acontecimentosatravés do hábito – um diamante não só é duro se resistir a ser riscado, mastambém há uma muito forte expectativa de que resista a esse teste. O significadodas concepções é então feito residir na relação de dois eventos, com aforma “se... então...”, sempre que tal proposição é verdadeira, ou, para utilizara terminologia peirceana, “exprime o que existe e que é tal como a proposiçãoo expressa”. 118 Mas a ser assim, tem de existir real vagueness, verdadeira indeterminação,e uma possibilidade objectiva na natureza, pois uma proposiçãocondicional “é uma proposição sobre um universo de possibilidade”. 119Por isso, em 1910, em carta a Paul Carus, Peirce pode rejeitar o nominalismodos seus trabalhos de juventude 120 por não admitir a existência de umadifferent possible kinds of material substance? And in what does that behavior consist exceptthat if a substance of a certain kind should be exposed to an agency of a certain kind, a certainkind of sensible result would ensue, according to our experiences hitherto. As for the pragmaticist,it is precisely his position that nothing else than this can be so much as meant by sayingthat an object possesses a character. He is therefore obliged to subscribe to the doctrine of areal Modality, including real Necessity and real Possibility.”, Collected Papers, 5.457.117 . Collected Papers, 8.362.118 . Collected Papers, 5.473.119 . “The pragmaticist has always explicitly stated that the intellectual purport of a conceptconsists in the truth of certain conditional propositions asserting that if the concept be applicable,and the utterer of the proposition or his fellow have a certain purpose in view, he would actin a certain way. A purpose is essentially general, and so is a way of acting; and a conditionalproposition is a proposition about a universe of possibility. ”, Collected Papers, 5.528.120 . “In regard to the first Essay consisting of the first two articles, the principal positiveerror is its nominalism, especially illustrated by what I said about Gray’s stanza, "Full manya gem"etc., . . I must show that the will be’s, the actually is’s, and the have beens are not thesum of the reals. They only cover actuality. There are besides would be’s and can be’s that arereal. The distinction is that the actual is subject both to the principles of contradiction and ofexcluded middle; and in one way so are the would be’s and can be’s. In that way a would be isbut the negation of a can be and conversely. But in another way a would be is not subject to theprinciple of excluded middle; both would be X and would be not X may be false. And in thislatter way a can be may be defined as that which is not subject to the principle of contradiction.On the contrary, if of anything it is only true that it can be X [then] it can be not X as well.It certainly can be proved very clearly that the Universe does contain both would be’s andcan be’s.”, Collected Papers, 8.216.www.labcom.pt✐✐✐✐