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struggles among subject nationalities. The Ottomans' attempts to hold theempire together and to resist European encroachment generated complexresponses, including an effort to promote both an Ottoman supranationalismand, among progressive intellectuals, constitutionalism. After a brieffirst period of constitutional rule in 1876-1878, this combination of ideasresurfaced in the Young Turk movement of 1889-1918. The Young Turkstriumphed with the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, but their triumphwas undermined by European landgrabbing and the onset of the empire'sterminal crisis, which lasted roughly from 1908 until 1923.The Ottomans' commitment to constitutional revolution and theiravoidance of social revolution become comprehensible from the widespreadfear that revolution (ihtilal) would provoke the breakup of the empire,vvhereas the more moderate transformation implied by the vvorld inkilap,in a political context already committed to constitionualism, mighthelp hold it together. on into the early republican years, we fınd certainOttoman intellectuals, like Halide Edib Adıvar 4 , who did talk about revolution,and others, like Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu 5 , who did not. Theidea of inkılap was also trivialized or tamed in a sense by using the termto refer, not only to Turkey's transformation in general, but to individualones of the early republic's reforms.While any hint of revolution seems to disappear at that point, wecould add that the breakup of the cosmopolitan empire and the creation inits place of a nation-state, or somethineg close to one, did serve as a kindof proxy for social revolution. The critical social variable for the late Ottomanshad been, not class, but ethnicity. The Ottomans did not experiencethe class conflict of social revolution so much as they experiencedthe ethnic conflict of a collapsing multinational state. With its fail, practicallyali the non-Turkish ethnicities disappeared from the domestic scene;what had been internal problems became external, and usually less pressingissues; and the Turkish leadership was left facing what it saw at thetime as a classless Turkish population that needed to be molded into nationalismand citizenship. Ali the forms of "difference" lodged within thiscitizenry would not become chronic and acute issues, for Turkey as forother countries, until the 1960s and later.In the brief comment on constitutional revolution with which Iopened this discussion, two elements remain to account for. One is howTurkey coped with external dependency relations. In the most immediate,short-term sense, it did so by winning against the Greeks in the military4. Halide Edib Adıvar, Ateşten Gömlek, İstanbul, 1997, consistently using the term ihtilal;for example see pp. 84, 90-91, 98, 99, 101, 104, 109, 121-123.5. Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, Panorama, İstanbul, 1987, many references to inkilab,for example on pages 43, 44, 45, 53, 56, 62, 65, 108, 109, 111-114, 118, 121-122,125, 148, 150, 175, 211, 215, 218, 222, 227, 301, 337, 350, 366, 484, 487, 494-496,500, 551-553, 555-557, 572.94