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poor, or other economically defıned groups, but between peoples belongingto different cultural entities." (16) The EU countries' rather strict andnarrow interpretation of their own national interests is, of course, not onlyconfıned to Turkey and seems to be part of a general emerging pattern.Russia, for instance, is going through a similar experience. In spite of itsavovving itself part of a "common European home", Russia is pointedlyand deliberately being isolated through the extension of NATO to theVisegrad countries. Like Turkey, Russia vvill probably forever remainoutside the inner circle of the Eu family of nations.It is fairly easy to surmise that this "cultural apartheid" on the part ofEurope, whould stir up anti-European and anti-Western sentiments inTurkey and create a fertile ground for fundamentalist extremism. The21.5 percent voter support garnered by Mr Erbakan's Islamist WelfareParty in the 1995 parliamentary elections should be seen as an earlyvvarning signal to the West that something is afoot in Turkey which, inthe end, could affect their interests even more adversely and permanentlythan a Turkish membership of the European Union. According to theLondon Economist: "Tvvo prospects loom, both undesirable. First, manyreligious-minded Turks vvill become stili more resentful of their purportedlypro-vvestern leaders... Second, many secular-minded Turks are likelyto retreat into even surlier resentment [vis-â-vis Europe]." (17) Thesecular heritage of Atatürk is, therefore, under pressure and says theEconomist. "at some point, Turkey could be ready to give up its frustratingand humiliating role as a beggar pleading for membership in the Westand to resume its much more impressive and elevated historical role asthe principal Islamic interlocutor against the West" (18).As vve have argued, Kemalism does not presuppose the indefınitemaintenance of the status quo concerning Turkey's external relations andforeign policy. An evangelical pro-Western posture is not part of theKemalist doctrine. Apparently this is not vvhat Western countries believe.Turkey's availability as a strategic partner is almost taken for granted. Itis unclear vvhat the level of Turkey's tolerance is, but it cannot be unlimited.Huntington's "do a South Africa"-scenario could indeed develop intoa plausible alternative if European cultural chauvinism and sectional interestscontinue to keep Turkey feel unvvanted. Although Turkish toleranceof vvhat amounts to humiliation should be admired, but it vvould beunvvise for the country's policy-makers to sit and vvait for the inevitable.The vvise and prudent thing to do to is to embark timeously on a processof reconstruction of Turkey's foreign policy architecture. This reconstructionshould be based on the realistic assumption that secularism andWesternism are not intertvvined like Siamese tvvins.This may be happening already. Revisionism, albeit in a rather carefuland limited vvay, already seems to have found its vvay into Turkey's708