PDF Dosyası - Ankara Üniversitesi Kitaplar Veritabanı

the Cold War. Even more serious, and enduring, has been the legacy ofthe Kemalist Republic's pre-World War II incorporation of Hatay, tovvhich Syria has never relinquished its claim. This underlying source oftension betvveen Turkey and Syria has led to further complications in relationsbetvveen the tvvo states, particularly once the Kurdish issue cameto provide a point of increasing strain betvveen Ankara and Damascus.More recently, of course, Turkey's support of the international coalition'svvar against Saddam Hussein's Iraq plunged relations vvith that country toa low point as vvell. In the years since, repeated Turkish military incursionsseeking to deny northern Iraq as a base for Kurdish separatists havefurther soured relations vvith Baghdad. Finally, both Syria and Iraq havebeen alarmed and offended by Turkey's massive project for the developmentof southeastern Anatolia, vvhich has reduced the flovv of vvater tothose tvvo Arab countries.Despite such elements of stress vvith the tvvo Arab states immediatelyon its borders, Turkish-Arab relations since World War II have been generallypositive. Moreover, the current level of tensions vvith Iraq is probablybest vievved as an abberation occasioned by the combined impact ofSaddam Hussein's sudden challenge to the vvorld community and the aftermathof the Gulf War, vvhich left northern Iraq effectively beyond thelimits of Baghdad's mandate. The relatively high levels of trade betvveenthe tvvo countries that prevailed prior to the Gulf War, as vvell as theirshared political interest in combating Kurdish separatism, vvill probablyreemerge as strong inducements for a mending of fences once SaddamHussein's regime passes from the scene. Seen in perspective, even thelong-standing frictions betvveen Turkey and Syria have been handled byboth sides vvith the clear purpose of avoiding outright conflict. The dynamicsof the tensions that broke out betvveen the tvvo states in the fail of1998 seem to reinforce this point.On the other hand, the Arab World's very diversity has helped Turkeydevelop fruitful relationships vvith Arab states. Turkish contractorsand manufactured goods found markets in the Gulf States, North Africaand Egypt. While overall levels of trade remained modest in comparisonto Turkey's economic relations vvith Europe and other areas, they vverenot insubstantial. Arab oil producers (including of course Iraq prior to theGulf War), vvere unvvilling to sacrifice the Turkish market on behalf ofArab nationalist ideology or Syria's territorial claims against Turkey.Turkey's adhesion to the Islamic Conference in the 1970s vvas more indicativeof the value it accorded to economic ties vvith the Arab Worldthan of any erosion of secularist Kemalist principles vvithin the regime.In short, then, by the closing decades of the Tvventieth Century, Turkey'srelations vvith the Arab areas över vvhich the Sublime Porte onceheld almost unchallenged svvay had metamorphosed into a rather satisfactorypattern of interstate relations, marred but not seriously disrupted by590