PDF Dosyası - Ankara Üniversitesi Kitaplar Veritabanı

ondly, a reassessment vvould be made of Turkey's place and role in theworld. What complicates matters further is that these two issues are closelyinterdependent as a nation's foreign policy is essentially a derivative ofits domestic policy and its cultural underpinnings. Obviously other optionsare available to Turkey beyond renouncing secularism and "doing aSouth Africa" in order to reach for a better future. The most obvious andimmediate area vvhere to look for these options seems to be in the domainof Turkish foreign policy. A more innovative foreign policy, strengtheningTurkey's international diplomatic clout and bargaining power, wouldgreatly help to give new purpose and unity to the Turkish nation. By thesame token, trying to maintain the foreign policy status quo could conceivablyharm or undermine Turkey's Kemalist secular character. On theother hand, prudent strategic adaptations to the existing foreign policyshould actually lead to the reinforcement of the Kemalist legacy.As already pointed out, the inclusion of "reformism" and "populism"among the "six arrovvs" of Kemalism seems to indicate a build-in dynamicor evolutionary element in Atatürk's philosophy. Therefore, a completevolte face in Turkey, in order to reach future national goals, does notseem necessary. In South Africa and Russia changes vvere of a zero-sum,or paradigmatic(8) nature, in the sense that apartheid and communism,because of their obsolescence, vvere totally and summarily dispensed vvithand and replaced by something totally and radically nevv and different. Achange of Turkey's secular character vvould obviously faal in the zerosumor paradigmatic category because Islamizaton implies a total replacementof the old order in a non-evolutionary manner. This dynamic perspectiveraises the possibility of incremental or even peace-meal changesin areas not affecting secularism, for instance in the realm of foreign policy.In other vvords, Kemalism does not preclude Turkey from realigningitself to the realities of the post-Cold War vvorld. Indeed, such foreignpolicy changes may in time become an important prerequisite for a greatermeasure of internal unity and national consensus in Turkey. Of immediateconcern is Turkey's persistence vvith an almost evangelistic pro-Western stance. The latter disposition seems to be a Cold War relic vvhichhas little to do vvith the survival of Kemalist Turkey.The policy, because of its persistent inability to produce successfulresults, could very vvell help to galvanise popülist fundamentalist forces'opposition to secularism. An important question is, of course, vvhetherTurkey could remain secularised and Westernised, vvithout being ideologicallypro-Western, or for that matter, a captive ally of NATO? The answerseems to be "yes". When Atatürk proclaimed the foreign policy dictumof "peace at home and peace abroad", he, according to Lord Kinross,conveyed the nation that: "The Turks vvere the friends of ali civilised nations.The hatchets of the past, vvith its lust for conquest, vvere buried.The Turkish mind harboured no thoughts of reconquest or revision of705