PDF Dosyası - Ankara Üniversitesi Kitaplar Veritabanı

They appealed to a larger percentage oef voters, because of their betterorganized party structures and militants who work actively at the grassrootslevel, the generally competent management of the municipalitiesthey control. Also a sizeable leftist popular electorate voted for them, becausethey vvere disappointed by the social democratic parties. Welfareestablished netvvorks at the local political level, co-operated vvith the tarikat,vvhich have a large social base, and developed charitable and educationalassociations. Clearly, Welfare vvas on its vvay tovvards a mass party,vvhich vvould have inevitably led it tovvards becoming more of a very conservativeright-vving party, and less of an extremist one. After the closingof the Welfare, in December 1997, its successor, the Virtue Party, inheritedthe same characteristics. Furthermore, it seems to have been moremoderate and to abandoned the objective of conquering the State. Theprogramme of the Virtue refers only to the principles of democracy, humanrights, freedoms, and socio-economic development. In fact, Islamistshave been vvorking for years vvith a civil society context, on issues suchas human rights there is an Islamist human rights association, Mazlumder(Association of the oppressed), the counterpart of the secular TurkishHuman Rights Association, as vvell as the environment, pluralist democracy,gender, inter-religious dialogue and individuation. There is now anincreasing transversal dialogue, vvithin civil society, betvveen the Islamistassociations and social democratic and other secular democratic associationson problems of common interest.The Virtue Party's leadership is more moderate than the Welfare's.its social base is getting broader and more heterogeneous. There is an increasinglypovverful group of Müslim entrepreneurs and industries. Ultimately,the majority of Islamists today are individuals and groups vvhoare already part of modernity, or strongly aspiring to be part of it, butthrough their ovvn discourse, symbols and cultural codes, and their discourseis becoming more open to the issues of modern society and to publicdebate. It is less radical, more consensual; less obsessed by the conquestof the State and more inclined to act vvithin competitive politics andthe civil society. The individuation process is influenceing islamists. Theindividual choice concerning the relation to the religion and its understandingis gaining ground.This does not mean that the majority of them has already becomestrict democrats. Also, given the historical experience of Turkey, it is unavoidablethat democratic and ideological vigilance —but not unnecessarycoercion, vvhich vvas recently used against the Islamist mayor of istanbul,Mr. T. Erdoğan— be exercized vis-â-vis Islamists. Hovvever, to ignore theabove developments that are gradually changing the outlook of politicalislam is not in the interests of democratization. There vvill probably bemore conflictual situations and tensions betvveen the Islamists and secularists,but the likelihood is that the Turkish society is in the process of242