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countries; only Iceland, Ireland, Portugal and Sweden received less 22 . Thecoincidence of aid flows and rapid growth in Europe has led many academicobservers, politicians and the general public to believe in a casuallink. This view has recently been the subject of a lively academic debate.The traditional view that this massive transfer of recources made a considerablecontribution to the economic recovery of Western Europe hascome under heavy attack 23 . A comparison of the aid receipts of individualcountries (in per cent of their GNP) and their economic performance asmeasured by the growth of GNP and exports reveals no clear picture. Astatistical analysis shows only a weak and insignifıcant positive correlationbetvveen aid receipts in per cent of GNP and the growth of exportsand especially GNP in the 1948-1953 period 24 . Especially the negative effectof this program on the economic policy of West European countriesis emphasized. It is argued that "the Marshall Plan relieved Europeangovernments of the need to correct their economic policies in a vvaywhich would have made their countries attractive for private capital inflovvs.Instead, it encouraged the majority of European governments tocontinue with their internal policies of planification, demand expansionand prematüre redistribution" 25 . Accordingly, vvith regard to recent demandsfor a nevv Marshall Plan for eastern Europe, it is cautioned that"The Marshall Plan for Western Europe after World War II provides anexample that external fınancing may even retard rather than promote economicreforms" 26 . In the case of Turkey, however, the Marshall Plan aidhad a strong impact on the transition to a liberal economic policy regime.This transition evolved from a mix of domestically derived motivationsand goals, and from the need to respond to problems of the vvorld systemas a vvhole. The nevv economic policy originated out of a successfulmeshing of Turkish policy makers' concerns about the structural needs ofthe Turkish economy vvith their recognition that international aid vvouldbe available only vvith liberalization of the economy and democratizationof the country. There thus existed, after the Second World War, a harmonyof interests betvveen the donor country, the U.S., and the recipientcountry, Turkey, on the scope and purposes of the aid. The economic policiesof Menderes's Democrat Party, vvhich came to povver after the elec-22. W. Kostrzewa, P. Nunnenkamp, H. Schmiedling, "A Marshall Plan for Middle andEastern Europe?", Kiel Working Papers No. 403, Kiel: The Kiel Institute of VVorldEconomics, 1989, p. 8, Table 1.23. Werner Abelshauser, "Zur Funktion des Marshallplans beim vvestdeutschen Wideraufbau",Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, Vol. 37, 1989, No. 1, pp. 85-113. TylerCowen, "The Marshall Plan: Myths and Realities", in: Doug Bandow (ed.), U.S.Aid to the Developing World-A Free Market Agenda, Washington, D.C., 1985. AlanS. Milvvard, The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-1951, Berkeley/Los Angeles1984.24. W. Kostrzewa, P. Nunnekamp, H. Schmieding, "A Marshall Plan for Middle andEastern Europe?", Kiel VVorking Papers No. 403, December 1989, p. 8, Table 1.25. Ibid., p. 10.26. Ibid., p. 30.768