PDF Dosyası - Ankara Üniversitesi Kitaplar Veritabanı

lar instance of this is the treatment given by German journalism to theKurdish Question in Turkey".Making reference to Yugoslavia, the former Soviet Union, and themonarchy of the Shah in Iran, the correspondent of a reputable Germannewspaper vvrote: "it is disturbing that ali three countries demonstrateparallels vvith the Turkish-republic... Ali three states collapsed due to religiousor ethnic contradictions. Turkey demonstrates both variants: a politicizedislam and the Kurdish rebellion in the southeast region of thecountry..." 12 This image of a Turkey characterized by multiple fault lines,primarily the product of Orientalists and their students vvho have foundpositions in the media, has in the meantime become established. Since accordingto the German Turkey specialists the putative cause of ali ofthese fault lines is Kemalism, vve vvill subsequently concern ourselvesvvith the German vievv of Kemalism as vvell as vvith the explanatory systemthat accompanies it. The thesis of three fault lines in Turkish societyimplies that either the Turkish nation is merely an official rhetorical fictionor that it encompasses only those vvho adhere to the Sunnite confession.As a result, this criticism of Kemalism targets tvvo of the centralprinciples of Kemalism, national unity and secularism, which supposedlylead to polarization and are likevvise supposed unable to deal vvith culturaldiversity. Proposals for solutions extend from "a nevv interpretation ofKemalism" to the complete renunciation of Turkish Republic(föderalistisches Modeli). The advocates of the fault lines thesis are of theopinion that the Turkish Republic has diffıculties both vvith "the Kurdishnational minority" as vvell as vvith "Moslems" per se.IIAlthough the PKK had already increased the intensity of its terroristactivities at the end of 1984, it took German journalism a relatively longtime before it took up the "Kurdish Question" in Turkey. In the nineteenseventies, the opinion in Germany vvas actually opposed to a Kurdishstate on Iraqi territory, vvith the justifıcation of opposing Soviet plans forexpansion in the Middle East. In addition, today's trendy proposals for anethnic rearrangement of the maps of the Middle East vvas then disapprovedof as being a remnant of "the political ideas of the tvventies". Oras Harald Vocke put it: "The West too has nothing to gain from the establishmentof a Kurdish state. For Moscovv, on the other hand, such a statevvould constitute a land bridge to the most important oil fıelds of the PersianGulf' 13 . But after the Soviet threat had subsided, a different assessmentvvas made of Iraq. In 1991, another German foreign policy expertstated:11. Uvve Simson: der islam Samuel P. Huntington und wir, Orient, 3/1997, p. 519.12. VVolfgang Koydl: Die Türkei im kritischen Alter, Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ), 11/19/1998.13. Harald Vocke: Revolution in Kurdistan, FAZ, 8/22/1979.821