PDF Dosyası - Ankara Üniversitesi Kitaplar Veritabanı

part due to the fact that the Turkish Republic since its foundation did notpay any attention to the arab vvorld, given its behaviour tovvards the OttomanEmpire during the first vvorld vvar, as the Arabs vvere considered asinconsistant and unreliable.With a vvrong appreciation of the real political evolution of the MiddleEast in mind, the Turkish governement, at the beginning of the fıfties,planned to bring Turkey in the position of a keystone of a pro-Westernmiddle eastern military alliance. This policy resulted in the establishment,in november 1955, of the Baghdad Pact vvhose members vvere Turkey,Iraq, Iran and Pakistan. From the very beginning the Pact vvas consideredby most of the Arab States as an imperialist military tool placed at thedisposal of the United States and directed against the arab nationalist regimes.Turkey vvas therefore regarded vvith high suspicion by the counriesof the third vvorld. At the Bandung Conference in 1955, Nasser receivedan acolade as a leader of the Third World, vvhile Turkey became isolatedbecause of her strong defense of NATO and blistering attacks on nonalignement,neutralism, socialism and communism 3 .Nevertheless, the Baghdad Pact contributed to strengthen its tiesvvith Iran, vvhose relations vvith Turkey vvere already friendly since thefoundation of the Republic.In Turkey itself, the Baghdad Pact vvas bitterly criticised by opponentsinspired by the neutralist tradition initiated by Atatürk. For thesecritics the identification of Turkey vvith vvestern imperialism vvas counterproductive as it isolated Turkey from the vvorld outside of the vvestern alliance4 . Nevertheless vvhatever the bitter criticism of the foreign policy ofthe Menderes government can be justified as being in complete contradictionvvith the principles inherited from the period of Atatürk, one has torecognise that the vvorld order originated by the cold vvar until 1963 leftalmost no choice to littel and middle size states except a more or lessstrict alignement on one of the süper povvers, especially if they vvere, asTurkey, directly threatened by Soviet territorial claims. As far as theTurkish governement vvas concerned in the fifties, it remained neverthelessin relative accordance vvith Atatürk's legacy globally on at least threepoints: the rejection of communism, the defense of the territorial integrityof the Nation, vvhich implied at this moment strong military ties vvith theWest, and the pursuance of vvesternisation of the country on social, economicaland political grounds. Moreover, it is obvious that in the framevvorkof the cold vvar and the division of most of the vvorld into tvvo antagonistblocs left no vvay for practising a policy of neighbourlinessvvhich vvas the basis of Atatürk's foreign policy of proximity, and a fun-3. idem, pp. 118-119.4. idem, p. 120.605