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Therefore, while the constitutional separation of the State and religionin Turkey is obviously an excellent measure and should not be modifıed(amongst Protestant countries, Sweden is currently in the process ofdoing the same), the secularization model fıts Turkey's conditions betterthan laiklik' 6 . Ali the more so that secularization means, in the broadestsense, the acceptance of plurality, vvhether religious, social or cultural. Italso means a clearer distinction of the private and public spheres in relationto religion. It is thus more democratic. What is needed in Turkey isto foster a secularization which concerns individuals, society and theState. The way laiklik is currently understood and practised is not democratic.It is exclusionary, generates polarization and hence is detrimentalto social cohesion and peace. It forces the State-society relations to revolvearound a cultural issue --laiklik vs. Islamism- instead of economicand social issues. Culturalism has monopolized the public space, to thedetriment of secular, pluralistic, democratic politics.The antagonistic counterpart of laiklik is Islamism, or the political islam.This opposition dates from the very beginning of the Ottoman-Turkish modernization vvhich started in the 19th century, around thequestion: how can the State be saved? The answer by the Ottoman religiousbureaucracy -ulema— was to return to a strict application of shariat,and that of the palace bureaucracy was to turn to the West and import thenecessary administrative and technological innovations. The latter approachprevailed, but the former never gave up the struggle throughoutthe 19th century. This opposition betvveen two irreconcilable vvorld viewswas radicalized under the Young Turks and the Kemalists in the 1910sand 1920s. The current State elites stili operate along the idea of the absoluteincompatibility of these two vvorld views. So do Islamist leaders andtheir followers. They position themselves in relation to the State and aimat comquering it. In the 1980s and 1990s, they moved in this direction,through education in religious secondary State schools (İmam Hatip Liseleri)and a strategy of entrism in public administration. When the WelfareParty was in povver, leading the coalition government, from July 1996 toJune 1997, the temptation to take över the Republican State existed.However, the Welfare Party never resorted to violence. its chief, NecmeddinErbakan, a seasoned traditional politician, and most of its leadingfıgures were, vvith a few exceptions, rather moderate. Radical Islamistpoliticians vvere vocal and implemented a "stategy of tension", butformed a small minority. In the public, even under the Welfare government,opinions against the imposition of shariat (60%) outnumbered thepro-shariat ones (25%) 17 . In the 1995 elections, the Welfare got 20.7% ofthe votes. While the totalitarian tropism of Islamists is not to be underestimated,they vvere, by and large, respectful of the democratic rules.16. see ibid.17. Erder, Necat (1966), Türkiye'de siyasi parti seçmenlerinin nitelikleri, kimlikleri veeğilimleri, İstanbul, TÜSES.241