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ing Cebesoy in command of the 7th Army he set off instantly for Adana,vvhere Von Sanders had rejoined the group headquarters, travelling nonstopuntil he got there and assumed command on 31 October. The armistice,for Atatürk, vvas not an end. At the farevvell party given for the departureof the German general, Atatürk responded to the former's speechto the effect that for them vvhile the vvar against the Allies might be över,the vvar for Turkish independence vvas beginning at the very moment. Undefeatedin battle he vvas more than ever undefeated in spirit. Therevvould novv be peace of a kind. But he knevv that a just peace vvould haveto be fought for and that the struggle vvould be hard and long. Atatürk endeavouredto reorganize and reinforce against any eventuality the tvvo armies(2nd and 7th) remaining under the commad of Lightning ArmiesGroup and established contact vvith the 6th Army to his east in Mosul. Atthe end of four years of vvar, the fighting morale of the Turkish army vvasby no means affected as the British, French and Italian occupation forcesand the Greeks vvere to find out to their cost in the immediate postvvaryears 21 .But it vvas only on 3 November, vvhen he vvas sent the full text of thearmistice that he realized vvhat sort of terms the Prime Minister and DefenceMinister Ahmet İzzet Pasha's (Furgaç) government had agreed to.The armistice generally demanded the retention of ali forces on bothsides behind the line of contact as of noon 31 October. Although this apparentlyassured the Turkish heartland in Anatolia against an Allied invasionfrom the south, a number of pretexts for vvidespread Allied armedpresence throughout both Asia Minör and eastern Thrace vvere suggestedby several clauses. Atatürk sensed in these vagaries a deliberate Britishattempt at deception. As the Turkish leader subsequently observed, it containedclauses vvhich gave Entente Povvers potentially complete control ofthe country: specifıcally, the immediate demobilization of the army, theright of the Allies to occupy any strategic point (to be defıned by the victors)deemed necessary in the Ottoman Empire and control över themeans of communication 22 .The fırst political necessity novv became clear: to bring the armisticeterms under control by close defînition or if necessary revision, and to resisttheir misinterpretation by the British, by threat of force if need be. Heat once vvired back to the Prime Minister requesting clarification of theclauses affecting his army. "The Armistice of Moudros is not intended tosecure the safety of the Ottoman Empire. The clauses are not explainedclearly. They are vague and have vvide meanings. It is necessary to clarifythem explicitly or today the Allies vvill demand the Taurus line and tomorrovvthe city of Konya". In a hectic telegraphic correspondence vvith21. Kemal Atatürk, Nutuk (The Grand Speech), Vol. 1, istanbul, 1934, p. 257. Cebesoy(1953), pp. 28-30. Bıyıklıoğlu (1962), pp. 20-29.22. Ibid. See also Ali Fuad Türkgeldi, Mondros ve Mudanya Mütarekelerinin Tarihi(History of the Armistices of Moudros and Moudania), Ankara, 1948, pp. 44-46.632