PDF Dosyası - Ankara Üniversitesi Kitaplar Veritabanı

frontiers." Kinross goes on to state that: "The nevv sovereign Republic,poised betvveen East and West, vvas to be a stabilising element. Thusthere vvere to be pacts both vvith Russia and her neighbours and vvith theEuropean povvers, both vvith Arab and the Balkan vvorlds, - Above ali,there vvas to be loyal and unquestioning co-operation vvith the League ofNations." 9 What is described here is a typically non-aligned foreign policyposture. But developments after World War II [in which Turkeystayed neutral], and particularly Turkey's stronger grovving identificationvvith the West and its joining of NATO in 1952, "caused the Turks to bedenounced by the non-Western, non-aligned countries at the 1955 BandungConference and to be attacked a blasphemous by Islamic countries"(10).The important and rather disturbing reality Turkey has to face up tois that its role and contribution as a loyal Western ally are being taken forgranted and beyond a few palliatives, like the nevv Customs Union, theycannot expect meaningful revvards for their contribution to Western security.It is highly unlikely that the ineluctable logic and laws of politicallifevvould allovv this asymmetrical relationship to continue indefinitely.As Huntington (11) points out, Turkey's NATO membership vvas a productof the Cold War... "its end removes the principal reason for that involvementand leads to a vveakening and redefinition of that connection.Turkey is no longer useful to the West as a bulvvark against the majörthreat from the north, but rather, as in the Gulf War, a possible partner indealing vvith lesser threats from the south." The crucial help Turkey providedto the anti-Saddam Hussein coalition met vvith substantial internalcriticism, and moreover, it failed to secure a more favourable attitudefrom the West. Western indifference vvas particularly exemplifıed by thefact that Germany, Turkey's traditional friend, refused to vievv an Iraqimissle attacks on Turkey as an attack on NATO. The same type of scenariono w seem to manifest itself in regard to Turkey's highly covetedgoal of membership of the European Union, vvhich it applied for alreadyin December 1989. Since then, the EU has approved the applications ofAustria, Finland, Svveden, and Norvvay in 1993, and in 1997, Poland,Hungary, and the Czech Republic vvere allovved in, vvhile at this point intime the Turkish application is stili being kept in abeyance. In December1997 the EU "humiliatingly put Turkey into a special sub-category of applicantsfor membership behind such countries as Bulgaria and Slovakia,meaning, in effect, that it had no change of joining the Eu in the foreseeablefuture."(12) By vvay of vvhat could perhaps be called a "second prize",Turkey vvas given a Custom's Union dispensation vvith the EU, only aftervvhat seemed to be considerable American pressure.The "idea of Turkey", strictly based a Kemalism, is that of a secular,democratic Müslim state vvith a market economy. Turkey modernisedalong Western lines, it associated vvith the West, and has during the longCold War years stood prepared to come to the defence of the West. But706