PDF Dosyası - Ankara Üniversitesi Kitaplar Veritabanı

has frequently been to rally support against some real or imagined threat,whether internal or external.A natural consequence has been that Arab regimes are distinguishedby their drive to acquire and amass sophisticated military capabilities. Initself, the high level of modern armaments prevailing in the Arab Worldprovides valid grounds for concern on the part of ali who interact with theregion. In such an environment regimes may find the temptation to utilizemilitary force irresistible and political tensions can therefore ali too rapidlyescalate into overt conflict. Quite apart from the enduring Arab-Israeliconflict, the frequency of inter-Arab armed clashes since World War IIstands as sad proof of this. On the other hand, the determined pursuit bymost Arab regimes of ever more technologically advanced weaponry portendslittle likelihood that the threat of sudden military confrontations inthe region will diminish in the foreseeable future. As shown by the 1990-91 Gulf War, the Arab World's resources and its strategically importantgeographical position not only preclude the possibility that the world canremain indifferent to majör upheavals in the area but also heighten theprospect that such eventualities will be further complicated by one or anotherform of external intervention.While the struggle to create and sustain regime legitimacy has been amajör factor in the Arab World's militarization-and, therefore, in the region'sunderlying instability—the pursuit of economic development hasbeen another majör avenue through which the search for regime legitimacyhas proceeded. It too, both historically and at present, has been a fieldin which policies have in effect been double-edged swords demonstrablycapable of promoting regional instability. The post-World War II era witnessedthe rise of directed economies throughout the Arab World (withthe exception of Lebanon). Whether one looked at the traditional states ofthe Arab Gulf or the so-called competing progressive states that sproutedin the wake of the rise to power in Egypt of Gamal Abdel Nasser, the storywas essentially the same. Command economies predominated and theauthoritarian bent of Arab political systems was justifıed by the rhetoric(or, in the case of the rentier Gulf States, the practice) of the state's roleas the economic engine whose efforts would rebound to the welfare of alicitizens.By the early 1970s, however, the failures of state-controlled economiesin the Arab World were evident. Över the next twenty-five years neoliberalperspectives slowly gained ground in the region. A variety of factorshave intervened to make the Arab World's switch from state-centricto market economies a protracted, somevvhat tentative, and uneven process.Among these, of course, are limited resources, the legacy of populist-welfareideologies, the endemic political instability that stili wracksthe region, and the full range of interlocking structures built up to sustainthe state's erstvvhile economic role. Hovvever, the chief constraint hasbeen, and remains, political.593