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the market and informal systems for contract enforcement 11 , the interrelationsamong social structures, culture, and economic and political institutions12 , the role of various organizations in facilitating cooperation, organizationalcomplementarities, and the institutional foundations of thestate 13 , to name but a fevv.In spite of this intensive research vvork, tvvo central issues raised byNorth have so far not been resolved: Firstly, "Why do economies once ana path of growth or stagnation tend to persist?", and secondly, "how tocreate adaptive efficiency in the short run" in order to release an economyfrom the path of stagnation. Concerning the second question, it is generallyaccepted that emulation is not a panacea. North asserted this bystressing the importance of informal rules and constraints in a societyvvhich adopts the institutional structure of a more successful society:"Economies that adopt the formal rules of another economy vvill havevery diferent performance characteristics than the first economy becauseof different informal norms and enforcement. The implication is thattransferring the formal political and economic rules of successful Westernmarket economies to third-vvorld and Eastern European economies is nota suffıcient condition for good economic performance" 14 . Recently, VictorNee stressed the same conclusion by comparing the economic performanceof transition economies. In these countries, governments "implementedfar-reaching transformation of formal rules of the game toinstitute market economies. (...) But vvhether rulers follovved blueprints ofcapitalist transition provided by Western economists of pursued a trialand-errorevolutionary approach, the behavior of economic actors frequentlybears little resemblance to the legitimate courses of action stipulatedby the formal rules. Instead, netvvorks based on personal connectionsserve to organize market-oriented behavior according to informalnorms reflecting the private expectations of entrepreneurs and politicians.They act in the shadovv of the state, often at odds vvith the goals formulatedby rulers. In China, informal privatization and local arrangements havecontributed to a remarkable tvvo decades of sustained economic grovvth.But in Russia, mafıa-like business netvvorks have operated to obstructBoris Yeltsin's efforts at building a modern market economy. What accountsfor the difference in results? One thing is certain: a one-sided fo-11. Karen Clay, "Trade VVithout Lavv: Private-Order institutions in Mexican California",Journal of Imw, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 13, No. 1 (April 1997), pp. 202-231.12. Masahiko Aoki, "Tovvard a Comparative institutional Analysis: Motivations andSome Tentative General Insights", Japanese Economic Revievv, Vol. 47, No. 1(March 1966), pp. 1-19.13. Randall L. Calvert, "Rational Actors, Equilibrium, and Social institutions", in: JackKnight and Itai Sened (eds.), Explaining Social institutions. Ann Arbor: University ofMichigan Press, 1996, pp. 57-94.14. Douglass C. North, "Economic Performance Through Time", op.cit., p. 366.764