PDF Dosyası - Ankara Üniversitesi Kitaplar Veritabanı

An alternative route to improving Turkey's international positionvvhich seems totally in line vvith Kemal's "peace at home and peaceabroad" doctrine, is that of "bridgebuilder" between nations and cultures.As Blanco Villalta vvrote:" At the end of the War of independence, Atatürkmade it an accomplished fact that his country stood equidistant fromEast and West. He created a Turkey vvhich was free of any bond of anykind, vvhich might tie her to either of these poles of povver... In this aspectthe Hero of Sakarya can be seen as a precursor of the Third World"(19). Villalta also made the important point that: "No one knovvs betterthan the Turks themselves vvhat dangers arise from the privileged locationof their country. It vvas thanks to that, that the Ottoman Empire achievedthe rapid development of its povver, but for the same reason it died, andthe city vvhich Napoleon said vvas vvorth the vvorld to her possessor is ajevvel difficult to keep".(20) Hovvever, there is also the more positive sideto the Turkish geopolitical and cultural equation as articulated by the formerTurkish Prime Minister Tansu Çiller, who said in 1993 that Turkeyvvas both a "Western democracy" and "part of the Middle East", and"bridges tvvo civilizations, physically and philosophically". In similarvein, President Sulleyman Demirel referred to Turkey as a "very significantbridge in a region extending from vvest to east, that is from Europe toChina".(21) This type of foreign policy vvould seem to be acceptable tothe majör internal cultural and religious groupings inside Turkey, andalso seems compatible vvith a policy of non-alignment. But to fulfil thisrole, Turkey vvill have to restructure the architecture of its foreign policy.Particularly it vvill have to redefine its position tovvards Europe and theWest. This is a difficult but necessary choice. But a change in the directionindicated is better than the status quo.Drastic foreign policy change in democratic countries is rather rarephenomenon because of traditional and almost primordial bipartisan perceptionsof the national interest. Such dramatic changes mostly happenonly after some majör domestic raptura or external upheaval. As alreadypointed out, a svvitch to a policy of non-alignment [or "Turkey fırst"]vvould not violate Atatürk's broad guidelines. indeed it should be seen asa return to classical Kemalism. The existing policy vvas manufacturedduring the post-Ataturk Cold War-period and has not been realigned tothe nevv realities yet. It is important to point out that a policy shift, suchas indicated, does not pre-suppose changes in Turkey's secular culture.Moreover, these changes, if they take place, need or ought not to be "anti-West". If carefully planned and orchestrated such a new policy could helpTurkey to broaden its range of foreign policy options considerably, includingof course, increasing its leverage on Europe. A sensible redefinitionof national purpose could help Turkey in a considerable measure tomend fences vvith the Arab and Müslim vvorlds and to redefine relationsvvith Russia, China, and India, thus creating a vvide array of nevv opportunitiesin the economic, security and diplomatie fields. At the same time,710