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the Prime Minister över next week Atatürk, aware now of the former'sconsiderable naivete about Entente intentions tovvards Turkey, progressedrapidly from lecturing him on the need for fırmness, to a refusal to obeymilitary orders, to open defiance of the personal instructions of the PrimeMinister, and vvithin seven days to resignation 23 .The armistice vvas in Atatürk's opinion an agreement by the OttomanEmpire to surrender itself unconditionally to the enemy. Not only that,but a promise to aid the enemy in its invasion of the country as vvell. Duringthe truce negotiations at Moudros the Ottoman delegation had missedthe hidden menace of clauses giving the Allies the right of occupyingstrategic points 'in case of disorder'. He realized that it vvould have to beresisted eventually and already on the fourth day of the armistice he beganto think of vvays and means. He vvas especially concerned about theclause demanding the vvithdravval of ali Turkish garrisons from Syria. Theexact northern frontier of Syria vvas unknovvn. Where, by defınition, vvasthe frontier of Syria? Did it follovv the line of the mountains northvvest ofAleppo? Or vvas it to be prolonged dovvn into the southern Anatolia, to includethe district of iskenderun? The British vvas novv claiming that hisgarrison, the 7th Army, vvas stationed in Syria, hence liable to surrender.British military authorities vvere making use of antiquated geographicalterms such as Cilicia, instead of the Province of Adana and Sanjak ofMaraş, vvhich had been put in the Moudros Armistice to occupy largerportions of Turkish territory 24 .The Prime Minister replied that the armistice did not give the Britishthe right to occupy iskenderun. Since, hovvever, the railvvays to the south,vvith their bridges, had been destroyed during the Turkish retreat, therewas a verbal gentleman's agreement that they should be allovved to usethe port and the road to Aleppo for the transport of their vvounded andsupplies to their forces. But the port and tovvn of iskenderun vvere to remainunder Turkish control. Atatürk vvas requested to inform the Britishcommander accordingly 25 .In his reply, Atatürk persisted in his objections, arguing that the Britisharmies had access to ample food supplies in Aleppo itself and in thesurrounding districts and that their real purpose vvas to occupy iskenderunand thus cut the retreat of the 7th Army and force it to surrender. On 5November Atatürk ordered that a British landing at iskenderun be opposedby force. He vvas convinced that the British request to use the port23. Atay (1965), pp. 63-64.24. Ibid.25. Ibid. pp. 68-69. The tovvn of iskenderun had great strategic value from both a navaland military standpoint. The port vvas of vital importance and vvas generally regardedas being one of the finest in the eastern Mediterranean. The area possessed a splendidnatural naval base. It vvas connected by rail vvith Toprakkale and thus vvith the mainlines running vvest to Ankara and istanbul.633