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very words of Captain Cyril Falls, the writer of the offıcial British vvarhistory, "so the last action of the Palestinian campaign of the British endedvvith a success for the Turks." He also held that "the Arab rebelsproved to be little more than a gadfly to a reorganized Turkish army.'" 3Again according to the same source, for the Turks, one man, and onealone, had gained it. The first reason why the Turks had fought as stoutlyas they did and had shaken off their demoralization vvas to be found in thepersonality and organizing povver of Atatürk. The majority of his forceshad gone through the disastrous battles and retreats, but they had recovereda good part of their traditional quality after being rested, re-equippedand inspired afresh. Atatürk did not lead his army from behind. With theunruffled aplomb and total disregard for personal safety, Atatürk vvasvvell forvvard, physically leading his men in the battle. And the ruggedand courageous Anatolian soldiers invariably responded favourably to thepersonal leadership and example set by their commander. Eyevvitnesseslater testifıed that the Turkish general personally fought among his menin the battle at Haritan. Thus an Ottoman officer of Arab origin vvhopassed during the vvar into the service of Sherif Hussein of Mecca informedCaptain Falls later that he fought a machine-gun in the battle atHaritan and that the fire vvas controlled and directed by Atatürk in person14 .In ali fairness the same could not be said of Atatürk's British counterpart.Major-General Macandrevv did not measure up to the professionalcompetence and qualities of battlefıeld leadership vvith vvhich the Turkishcommander vvas endovved. Burdened by the deadvveight of an outdatedmilitary tradition, Macandrevv appeared content to remain riveted to thearmy base at Aleppo vvhile his troops vvere fıghting for their lives on theslopes of Haritan 15 .In effect, the Turks vvere novv fighting on their ovvn soil, for thosehills and mountains behind them formed the natural boundary betvveenAnatolia, the Turkish heartland, and the Arab provinces of the OttomanEmpire. The historic land route betvveen Aleppo and Anatolia vvound upbehind the tovvn of iskenderun to the Belen Pass över the southern Amanusrange. This narrovv passage at an altitude of 730 meters vvas about 15kilometers southeast of the tovvn and that vvay vvas the direct road fromAleppo. The Belen Pass, knovvn as the Syrian Gates in history, had beenused from time immemorial as a commercial, administrative and militarylink of communication betvveen Syria and Cilicia. The passage of the SyrianGates vvas singularly adapted by nature for strategic control of thetraffıc.13. Falls (1964), pp. 171 and 167.14. Falls (1930), p. 616.15. Edroos (1980), p. 36.629