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to enhance its own legitimacy in the eyes of Egypt's largely apoliticalmasses by projecting itself as a defender of Islamic values.If, as seems the case, this is true, serious questions arise. CanEgypt's largely secular new entrepreneurial class be bolstered by a regimewhose repressive policies are increasingly justified in terms thatpromote the predominance of conservative Islamic social outlooks? Indeed,will a society in which the ambience appears to be sliding more andmore into a conservative Islamic mode be conductive to successful economicliberalization that aims at the country's integration into the vvorldsystem? Will the apparent contradictions in life-styles and values thatseparate the largely secularist entrepreneurial class from the masses of theEgyptian public fade away as a by-product of successful economic reform,or will they catalyze social unrest before the hoped for "trickledown" effect of economic liberalization occurs?Such questions will be answered by events in the coming years. Atthe moment it is quite clear that Egypt's economic reform amounts to arace against time. Success will be marked by the beginnings of sustainedeconomic grovvth; failure will be most likely be marked by extensive socialupheaval. In the meantime, the Islamist factor will continue to be amajör feature of the country's political life. By so ostentatiously linkingits search for legitimacy to Islamic values, Egypt's current regime tacitlyacknowledges that the majör domestic political challenge it faces comesfrom political, rather than militant, Islamic movements. Although the latterare capable of carrying hurtful terrorist actions, they do not pose a seriousthreat to the regime's survival, nor does it seem likely that they willdo so in the foreseeable future.Egypt's organized political Islamic movements are another matter.Whether openly active, such as the country's Labor Party, or quasiclandestine,such as the now banned Müslim Brotherhood, these groupspossibly do stand as credible competitors for the support of Egypt's middleand lower middle classes; or at least they would were the politicalsystem liberalized and freely competitive in the electoral marketplace.This, of course, is why the Müslim Brotherhood and its fellovv travelersin the Islamic political opposition share with secular liberal intellectualsthe sting of legalized repression.It is not inconceivable that there may be a budding irony in the regime'sfurtherance of a conservative Islamic atmosphere in today'sEgypt. For if and when the Müslim Brotherhood and other Islamic politicalgroups are allowed free scope to operate, the broader Egyptian publicmay fınd them more appealing than the incumbent regime.In this sense, Egypt is similar to other majör Arab countries thathave long been under the rule of authoritarian regimes. Although the riseof political islam has so far been blocked in the Arab World, its potential597