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the Kemalist paradigm vvill be tested further, and perhaps even more severelythan in the past.No nation can today escape the fact that the post-Cold War vvorldcharacterised by the expanding phenomenon of globalism has brought avastly different decision-making environment to the doorstep of everystate. Nevv choices, nevv policies, and nevv strategies vvill perforce characterisenatinoal and international political life in the millenium ahead ofus. Some states vvill have the vvisdom and foresight to adapt, in anticipationof these nevv future challenges, vvhile the laggers will find change beingthrusted upon them. The former category vvill be the vvinning statesand the leaders of tomorrovvv, vvhile the latter category vvill become increasinglymarginalised in a highly competitive vvorld of the future. Inmany cases the future of nations vvill depend on the redefınition of goals,policies and priorities and perhaps also radical re-alignment as far as externalcultural affinities and foreign policy are concerned.The basic precepts or roots of the Kemalist paradigm go back to atleast the middle of the 19th century. Atatürk articulated and concretized aspirit and a mood vvhich vvere embryonic, or at least latent, among Turksof some time. In 1865 already, the Association of the Nevv Ottomans setits aims on achieving drastic changes to the political institutions of theOttoman Empire and to counter European superiority through the adoptionof Western technology and science and Western political institutionsand values.(2) Although the constitutional reforms vvhich follovved theirinitiative vvere short-lived [1876-1878], a favourable climate vvas graduallycreated for the emergence of the Young Turk Movement around 1898,the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, the rise of Kemal Atatürk, the creationof the Republican People's Party, and the establishment of a nevv,modern, secular Turkey.It is a moot question vvhether history had, in the vvords of Fukuyama,suddenly "ended" for Turkey vvhen it embraced and canonised Kemalismas a national ideology. If history did in fact end for Turkey, it vvould belogical to assume that Kemal's basic principles or "six arrovvs", e.g. populism,republicanism, nationalism, secularism, statism, and reformism, asvvell as the rest of his political legacy, constitute the final vvord on the futurepolitical and cultural path of Turkey.(3) Sixty years have lapsedsince Atatürk left the scene, vvhich in the context of modern politics, is along time. During this period the Kemalist doctrine vvas subjected to thegeneral vvill and acquiescence of the citizenry; it vvas severely tested, andyet survived. In some vvay it is quite remarkable that the Atatürk legacydid survive, considering the fact the he presided över a de facto one-partvregime and that pover vvas concentrated at the top. Normally, this type ofgovernance provokes resentment and resistance and there is a backlash ofone kind or another once the leader leaves the scene. The opposite seems702