Administracion Estrategica - Hill - 8 edición

Notas 487
22. Consulte R. Biggadike, “The Risky Business of Diversification”, Harvard
Business Review (mayo-junio 1979): 103-111; R. A. Burgelman,
“A Process Model of Internal Corporate Venturing in the Diversified
Major Firm”, Administrative Science Quarterly 28 (1983): 223-244, y Z.
Block e I. C. MacMillan, Corporate Venturing (Boston: Harvard Business
School Press, 1993).
23. Biggadike, “The Risky Business of Diversification”; Block y Macmillan,
Corporate Venturing.
24. Buderi, Engines of Tomorrow.
25. I. C. MacMillan y R. George, “Corporate Venturing: Challenges for
Senior Managers”, Journal of Business Strategy 5 (1985): 34-43.
26. Consulte R. A. Burgelman, M. M. Maidique, y S. C. Wheelwright,
Strategic Management of Technology and Innovation (Chicago: Irwin,
1996), pp. 493-507. Consulte también Buderi, Engines of Tomorrow.
27. Buderi, Engines of Tomorrow.
28. Buderi, Engines of Tomorrow.
29. Consulte evidencias sobre adquisiciones y desempeño en R. E. Caves,
“Mergers, Takeovers, and Economic Efficiency”, International Journal
of Industrial Organization 7 (1989): 151-174; M. C. Jensen y R. S.
Ruback, “The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence”,
Journal of Financial Economics 11 (1983): 5-50; R. Roll, “Empirical
Evidence on Takeover Activity and Shareholder Wealth”, en J. C.
Coffee, L. Lowenstein y S. Rose (eds.), Knights, Raiders and Targets
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); A. Schleifer y R. W. Vishny,
“Takeovers in the 60s and 80s: Evidence and Implications”, Strategic
Management Journal 12 (edición especial, invierno de 1991): 51-60; T.
H. Brush, “Predicted Changes in Operational Synergy and Post Acquisition
Performance of Acquired Businesses”, Strategic Management
Journal 17 (1996): 1-24, y T. Loughran y A. M. Vijh, “Do Long Term
Shareholders Benefit from Corporate Acquisitions?”, Journal of Finance
5 (1997): 1765-1787.
30. Consulte evidencias sobre adquisiciones y desempeño en R. E. Caves,
“Mergers, Takeovers, and Economic Efficiency”, International Journal
of Industrial Organization 7 (1989): 151-174; M. C. Jensen y R. S.
Ruback, “The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence”,
Journal of Financial Economics 11 (1983): 5-50; R. Roll, “Empirical
Evidence on Takeover Activity and Shareholder Wealth”, en J. C.
Coffee, L. Lowenstein y S. Rose (eds.), Knights, Raiders and Targets
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); A. Schleifer y R. W. Vishny,
“Takeovers in the 60s and 80s: Evidence and Implications”, Strategic
Management Journal 12 (edición especial, invierno de 1991): 51-60; T.
H. Brush, “Predicted Changes in Operational Synergy and Post Acquisition
Performance of Acquired Businesses”, Strategic Management
Journal 17 (1996): 1-24, y T. Loughran y A. M. Vijh, “Do Long Term
Shareholders Benefit from Corporate Acquisitions?”, Journal of Finance
5 (1997): 1765-1787.
31. D. J. Ravenscraft y F. M. Scherer, Mergers, Sell-offs, and Economic Efficiency
(Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1987).
32. Consulte J. P. Walsh, “Top Management Turnover Following Mergers
and Acquisitions”, Strategic Management Journal 9 (1988): 173-183.
33. Consulte A. A. Cannella y D. C. Hambrick, “Executive Departure and
Acquisition Performance”, Strategic Management Journal 14 (1993):
137-152.
34. R. Roll, “The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers”, Journal of
Business 59 (1986): 197-216.
35. “Coca-Cola: A Sobering Lesson from Its Journey into Wine”, Business-
Week (3 de junio de 1985): 96-98.
36. P. Haspeslagh y D. Jemison, Managing Acquisitions (Nueva York: Free
Press, 1991).
37. Consulte perspectivas sobre este problema en L. L. Fray, D. H. Gaylin,
y J. W. Down, “Successful Acquisition Planning”, Journal of Business
Strategy 5 (1984): 46-55; C. W. L. Hill, “Profile of a Conglomerate
Takeover: BTR y Thomas Tilling”, Journal of General Management 10
(1984): 34-50; D. R. Willensky, “Making It Happen: How to Execute an
Acquisition”, Business Horizons (marzo-abril de 1985): 38-45; Haspeslagh
y Jemison, Managing Acquisitions, y P. L. Anslinger y T. E. Copeland,
“Growth Through Acquisition: A Fresh Look”, Harvard Business
Review (enero-febrero de 1996): 126-135.
38. M. L. A. Hayward, “When Do Firms Learn from Their Acquisition
Experience? Evidence from 1990-1995”, Strategic Management Journal
23 (2002): 21-39; K. G. Ahuja, “Technological Acquisitions and the
Innovation Performance of Acquiring Firms: A Longitudinal Study”,
Strategic Management Journal 23 (2001): 197-220; H. G. Barkema y F.
Vermeulen, “International Expansion Through Startup or Acquisition”,
Academy of Management Journal 41 (1998): 7-26.
39. Hayward, “When Do Firms Learn from Their Acquisition Experience?”
40. Consulte una reseña de la evidencia y cierta evidencia empírica en
sentido opuesto en D. E. Hatfield, J. P. Liebskind y T. C. Opler, “The
Effects of Corporate Restructuring on Aggregate Industry Specialization”,
Strategic Management Journal 17 (1996): 55-72.
41. A. Lamont y C. Polk, “The Diversification Discount: Cash Flows
Versus Returns”, Journal of Finance 56 (octubre de 2001): 1693-1721;
R. Raju, H. Servaes y L. Zingales, “The Cost of Diversity: The Diversification
Discount and Inefficient Investment”, Journal of Finance 55
(febrero de 2000): 35-80.
42. Por ejemplo, consulte Schleifer y Vishny, “Takeovers in the 60s and
80s”.
Capítulo 11
1. Fuentes: “Money Well Spent: Corporate Parties”, Economist (1 de noviembre
de 2003): 79; “Tyco Pair Sentencing Expected on September
19th”, Wall Street Journal (2 de agosto de 2005): 1: “Off to Jail: Corporate
Crime in America”, Economist (25 de junio de 2005): 81; N. Varchaver,
“What’s Ed Breen Thinking?”, Fortune (20 de marzo de 2006):
135-139.
2. E. Freeman, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach (Boston:
Pitman Press, 1984).
3. C. W. L. Hill y T. M. Jones, “Stakeholder-Agency Theory”, Journal of
Management Studies 29 (1992): 131-154; J. G. March y H. A. Simon,
Organizations (Nueva York: Wiley, 1958).
4. Hill y Jones, “Stakeholder-Agency Theory”; C. Eesley y M. J. Lenox,
“Firm Responses to Secondary Stakeholder Action”, Strategic Management
Journal 27 (2006): 13-24.
5. I. C. Macmillan y P. E. Jones, Strategy Formulation: Power and Politics
(St. Paul, Minn.: West, 1986).
6. Tom Copeland, Tim Koller y Jack Murrin, Valuation: Measuring and
Managing the Value of Companies (Nueva York: Wiley, 1996).
7. R. S. Kaplan y D. P. Norton, Strategy Maps (Boston: Harvard Business
School Press, 2004).
8. A. L. Velocci, D. A. Fulghum y R. Wall, “Damage Control”, Aviation
Week (1 de diciembre de 2003): 26-27.
9. M. C. Jensen y W. H. Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”, Journal of Financial
Economics 3 (1976): 305-360; E. F. Fama, “Agency Problems and the
Theory of the Firm”, Journal of Political Economy 88 (1980): 375-390.
10. Hill y Jones, “Stakeholder-Agency Theory”.
11. Por ejemplo, consulte R. Marris, The Economic Theory of Managerial
Capitalism (Londres: Macmillan, 1964); y J. K. Galbraith, The New
Industrial State (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1970).
12. Fama, “Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm”.
13. A. Rappaport, “New Thinking on How to Link Executive Pay with
Performance”, Harvard Business Review (marzo-abril 1999): 91-105.
14. R. Kirkland, “The Real CEO Pay Problem”, Fortune (10 de julio de
2006): 78-82.
15. D Henry y D. Stead, “Worker vs CEO: Room to Run”, BusinessWeek
(30 de octubre de 2006): 13.
16. Consulte estudios académicos que analizan las determinantes del sueldo
de un CEO en M. C. Jensen y K. J. Murphy, “Performance Pay and